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Abstract
The 1964 theorem of John Bell shows that no model that reproduces the predictions of quantum
mechanics can simultaneously satisfy the assumptions of locality and determinism. On the other
hand, the assumptions of signal locality plus predictability are also sufficient to derive Bell inequalities.
This simple theorem, previously noted but published only relatively recently by Masanes, Acin and
Gisin, has fundamental implications not entirely appreciated. Firstly, nothing can be concluded about
the ontological assumptions of locality or determinism independently of each other – it is possible to
reproduce quantum mechanics with deterministic models that violate locality as well as indeterministic
models that satisfy locality. On the other hand, the operational assumption of signal locality is an
empirically testable (and well-tested) consequence of relativity. Thus Bell inequality violations imply
that we can trust that some events are fundamentally unpredictable, even if we cannot trust that they
are indeterministic. This result grounds the quantum-mechanical prohibition of arbitrarily accurate
predictions on the assumption of no superluminal signalling, regardless of any postulates of quantum
mechanics. It also sheds a new light on an early stage of the historical debate between Einstein and
Bohr.
1 Introduction
Bell’s seminal 1964 paper [3] shows that quantum correlations violate the conjunction of local-
ity1 and determinism. However, there are quantum models that violate locality but maintain
determinism (Bohmian mechanics [8] is an example), and models that maintain locality but
violate determinism (standard operational quantum theory is an example). Thus nothing can
be concluded from Bell’s theorem about locality or determinism independently of each other.
Here we show that a remarkable conclusion can be reached by deriving Bell inequalities from
a different set of assumptions: signal locality (i.e. the impossibility to send signals faster than
light) and predictability (i.e. the assumption that one can predict the outcomes of all possible
1 Our usage of ‘locality’ here is the same as that of Bell in 1964: “that the result of a measurement on
one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system”. This assumption is sometimes referred to as
“parameter independence” and is strictly weaker than the assumption of “local causality”, which was later
introduced by Bell [5] to show that determinism does not need to be assumed, and that no locally causal model
(deterministic or otherwise) can reproduce quantum mechanics. See also Sec. 4.
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measurements to be performed on a system). These assumptions are purely operational, that is,
they refer to operational quantities only, in contrast to the ontological assumptions of locality
and determinism, which refer to properties of a hidden-variable model that reproduces the
observations. In particular, signal locality is an uncontroversial consequence of relativity, as
opposed to locality, which can be violated by the underlying hidden-variable model while still
maintaining signal locality at the observable level (as is the case with Bohmian mechanics,
which reproduces quantum mechanics).
This derivation therefore allows us to confidently conclude that predictability must fail for
experiments that violate Bell inequalities. In other words, it allows the conclusion that, if
it is impossible to signal faster than light, then it is impossible to predict the outcomes of
experiments that violate Bell inequalities, even if those outcomes might be determined by an
underlying hidden-variable model.
This work builds on and clarifies some recent results. In the 1994 paper where they sug-
gested Bell nonlocality as a “natural” axiom for quantum theory and brought to light the
existence of stronger-than-quantum correlations compatible with signal locality, Popescu and
Rohrlich [16] commented on an unpublished result of Aharonov to the effect that “relativistic
causality” and “nonlocality” imply “indeterminism”. Here we would like to point out that,
strictly speaking, this claim is incorrect: the conjunction of signal locality (i.e., what they
meant by “relativistic causality” and Bell-inequality violation (what they meant by “nonloc-
ality”) implies the failure of predictability, but not of determinism. While Aharonov’s result
was presumably correct with the appropriate translation, the choice of words seems to imply
they did not make at that stage the distinction between determinism and predictability, and
this work should clarify the importance of doing so.
This result also relates to the mechanism underlying the security of quantum key distribu-
tion based on signal locality and Bell inequality violations, as proven by Barrett, Hardy and
Kent [2]. In the discussion of their result, they cited a paper of Valentini [21] that purported
to show that “any state that is deterministic and nonlocal allows signalling”. Since what they
meant by “determinism” was the same as we here mean by “predictability”, this is essentially
the contrapositive of the present result. However, this was strictly speaking not proven in
Valentini’s paper. What he claimed to have proven was that for all nonlocal deterministic
hidden-variable theories, a violation of signal locality occurs if and only if the theory allows
a distribution of hidden variables different from that which is needed to reproduce quantum
mechanics, i.e., if and only if the distribution is different from that of “quantum equilibrium”2.
To our knowledge, the first correct published proof of this result can be found in an article
by Masanes, Acin and Gisin, that, following the suggestion of Popescu and Rohrlich, stud-
ied general properties of non-signalling theories [14]. However, they also did not distinguish
between predictability and determinism (like Aharonov and Valentini, they used “determin-
ism” to refer to what we call “predictability”). The present discussion should thus serve to
clarify the conceptual basis and importance of this result3.
2 Besides, Valentini’s main result seems to be flawed. He seems to have only proven the weaker result that
there exist distributions over the hidden variables which would allow signalling, as the reader may be convinced
by analysing the first equation on page 276 of [21].
3 After a first version of this work was posted on the arXiv (arXiv:0911.2504v1), another arXiv post
(arXiv:0911.3427v1, eventually published in Nature [15]) underscored the importance of the distinction by
proposing a scheme to generate random numbers certified by violation of a Bell inequality. Those results are
however somewhat distinct from the present one, in that to derive bounds on the randomness of the output
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This result also has an interesting didactical implication for the famous dialogues between
Einstein and Bohr on the foundations of quantum theory at the 1927 and 1930 Solvay con-
ferences. At this stage, prior to the 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen paper [10] and the
concept of entanglement that was born from it, it seems that Einstein attempted to attack the
validity of quantum mechanics, not only its completeness, by concocting thought experiments
aimed at obtaining a violation of the uncertainty principle [9]. However, by carefully applying
the uncertainty principle to the experimental apparatuses as well as the systems being meas-
ured, Bohr showed that the uncertainty principle was consistent ; that is, he showed that if
the uncertainty principle is valid for the degrees of freedom of all measuring apparatuses then
those measuring apparatuses can’t be used to violate the uncertainty principle associated to
a quantum system. Interestingly, in the last of such attempts from Einstein, Bohr used Ein-
stein’s own theory of general relativity to demonstrate the consistency of quantum mechanics.
Could Bohr have gone beyond that, and argued, with appeal to independent fundamental
principles, that the uncertainty principle must be valid?
In the remainder of this paper we will answer this question in the affirmative, and show
that an uncontroversial consequence of Einstein’s theory of special relativity (signal locality)
and some raw experimental observations (namely, the violation of Bell inequalities) lead to a
weak version of the uncertainty principle—perfect predictability of natural phenomena must
be impossible, regardless of any of the postulates of quantum mechanics.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the basic concepts and notation
required for the main result. The main result is proven in Section 3, followed by a discussion
of the result and concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Experimental metaphysics
Abner Shimony coined the term “experimental metaphysics” to refer to the field of study
pioneered by Bell, where general metaphysical4 concepts such as “local causality” are shown
to lead to experimental constraints which can be tested in the laboratory. In the following we
will introduce the concepts required to prove our main result.
The experimental setup considered here involves two spatially separated observers, Alice
and Bob, who can perform a number of measurements and observe their outcomes. For each
pair of systems they perform measurements upon, the choices of measurement settings and
their respective outcomes occur in regions which are space-like separated from each other,
so that no signal travelling at a speed less than or equal to that of light could connect any
two of them. For each pair of systems, we will denote by a and b Alice’s and Bob’s respective
measurement settings, and by A and B their corresponding observed outcomes. Note that here
we are following the notational convention Bell established in 1964 [3]. Each pair of systems
is prepared by an agreed-upon reproducible procedure κ (which in quantum mechanics would
define a quantum state for the pair of systems).
of a Bell experiment, those authors assumed the validity of the laws of quantum mechanics. Here no such
assumption is made (but consequently no bound is given on the randomness or unpredictability of the output).
4 For the physicist trained to be suspicious of philosophical terms, note that in this context the term ‘meta-
physics’ does not refer to mysticism, but to the study of formal and empirical properties of physical theories
themselves. (Experimental) metaphysics is to physics as metamathematics is to mathematics. It includes the
study of sets of physical theories which fail to represent observations, where this analysis can be illuminating
in understanding those that do not.
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We will define a phenomenon, for a given preparation procedure κ, by the relative fre-
quencies
f(A,B|a, b, κ). (1)
for all measurements a, b, and corresponding outcomes A, B. Note that this definition does
not assume a frequentist interpretation of probabilities. It simply acknowledges that in any
physical experiment, the actual phenomenon observed is encoded by those relative frequencies
(with some associated statistical uncertainty that can in principle be made arbitrarily small).
When an equation involving variables appears, it is to be understood that the equality holds
for all values of those variables.
We will say that a phenomenon is predictable, or that it satisfies predictability if and
only if
f(A,B|a, b, κ) ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
Now of course it is a consequence of the postulates of quantum mechanics that there are
unpredictable phenomena, according to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. However, we will
see that this conclusion can be reached independently of the postulates of quantum theory, by
using signal locality, i.e. the assumption that
f(A|a, b, κ) = f(A|a, κ), (3)
and the corresponding equation for B. Note that all the definitions above are purely opera-
tional, i.e. they refer to operationally defined, observable quantities only.
What Bell did was to consider, as did Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, the possibility that
there might be further variables (in addition to a, b and κ) that are relevant to the phenomenon
observed. We represent any such variables by the symbol λ5. They are not fully determined
by the preparation procedure κ, and as such may be deemed “hidden variables”. A more
appropriate terminology is “ontic variables”, since they represent any “real” physical state of
the parts of the world which are relevant to the experiments being considered. This terminology
also emphasises the distinction between κ and λ: κ represents the relevant variables known
by Alice and Bob (or by whichever party is describing the phenomenon), and λ represents the
variables that are objectively relevant to the experiments considered, regardless of whether
they are known or even knowable6.
An ontological model [20, 17, 12, 11] for a phenomenon is one in which the phenomenon
can be explained by considering ontic variables. It consists of the set Λ of values of λ, together
with a probability density µ(λ|κ) for every preparation procedure κ and a specification of
P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) (4)
which reproduces the phenomenon by
ˆ
Λ
dλµ(λ|κ)P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = f(A,B|a, b, κ). (5)
5 Note that considering the possibility that further variables exist is not the same as assuming that they
exist; there is no “hidden-variable assumption” in Bell’s theorem.
6 Indeed it is a corollary of the present result that in any deterministic model that reproduces quantum
theory the ontic variables must be necessarily unknowable.
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Note that in Eq. (5) we have used the assumption of free variables, which is the assump-
tion that the choices of experiment a, b, can be conditioned on variables which are uncorrelated
with λ. Formally, this is the assumption that
µ(λ|a, b, κ) = µ(λ|κ). (6)
This is sometimes called the “free will” assumption, but that terminology seems to imply
something about human capabilities that doesn’t seem to be necessary for the purposes at
hand.
We are now ready to define properties of models. A model is said to satisfy locality if
and only if
P (A|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|a, κ, λ), (7)
plus the corresponding equation for B7. A model is said to satisfy signal locality if and only
if
P (A|a, b, κ) = P (A|a, κ), (8)
plus the corresponding equation for B. Note that the left-hand-side of the equation here is
defined within the model as the left-hand-side of Eq. (5). We say that locality is an ontolo-
gical concept because it refers to ontic variables in its definition, while signal locality is an
operational concept because it only refers to operational variables in its definition. Note that
a model satisfies signal locality if and only if the corresponding phenomenon also does, i.e., if
and only if f(A|a, b, κ) = f(A|a, κ).
To see that a violation of Eq. (8) would imply the possibility to transmit signals between
the experimental sites, note that if the phenomenon violates signal locality, then there exist
at least two possible choices of setting b, b′ such that f(A|a, b, κ) 6= f(A|a, b′, κ). Therefore
by looking at the frequency of outcomes of A in a large enough ensemble (and in principle
it is possible for Alice to make all of the measurements in her ensemble space-like separated
from all measurements in Bob’s ensemble), Alice can determine with arbitrary accuracy what
setting Bob has chosen, thus allowing Bob to send signals to Alice.
Violation of locality, on the other hand, does not imply signalling, since in general only the
probabilities for Alice’s outcomes conditioned on the hidden variables depend on the choice of
experiments at Bob’s site. But since those hidden variables can be unknowable in principle,
that kind of non-locality cannot necessarily be used to transmit signals. Bohmian mechanics
is an example of a model that violates locality but not signal locality.
We now come to the crucial distinction between the concepts of determinism and pre-
dictability. A model is said to be deterministic, or to satisfy determinism8, if and only
if
P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) ∈ {0, 1}, (9)
7 We remind the reader that this corresponds to Bell’s definition of locality introduced in 1964 [3]. There
are instances in less formal publications, for example Ref. [4], where Bell used the term “locality” more loosely
to mean the property which quantum mechanics lacked, as revealed by his theorem. However these are very
much the exception, and from 1976 on, Bell almost invariably used the term “local causality” for this property.
8 There is another useful sense of determinism which needs to be distinguished from the one we are using
here. Quantum mechanics can be said to be deterministic in the sense that for a closed system the state at
a later time is determined through unitary evolution by the state at an initial time. However, operational
quantum mechanics is not deterministic in the sense used in this paper, since of course a system undergoing a
measurement interaction is no longer a closed system.
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which implies that A and B can be specified as functions as follows:
A = A(a, b, κ, λ), B = B(a, b, κ, λ). (10)
On the other hand, a model is said to be predictable, or to satisfy predictability if and
only if
P (A,B|a, b, κ) ∈ {0, 1}. (11)
This implies that A and B can be specified as functions as follows:
A = A(a, b, κ), B = B(a, b, κ). (12)
Determinism, like locality, is an ontological concept while predictability, like signal locality,
is an operational concept. As with signal locality, a model is predictable if and only if the
phenomenon it reproduces is predictable. It is interesting to note that it is impossible for a
phenomenon to violate determinism by itself: every phenomenon can be given a deterministic
model, simply by postulating a sufficient number of hidden variables.
Obviously, predictability implies determinism, but the converse is not true. Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle implies that no model that reproduces quantum mechanics is predictable,
but it imposes no limitation on determinism. In fact, there are models of quantum mechanics
(Bohmian mechanics is an example) which are deterministic, but the following theorem shows
that they must nevertheless be unpredictable (or violate signal locality).
3 Bell inequalities from signal locality and predictability
John Bell’s 1964 theorem [3] demonstrated that the conjunction of the concepts of locality
and determinism as defined above leads to a set of experimental constraints known as Bell
inequalities, and that some predictions of quantum mechanics regarding entangled states vi-
olate those inequalities. For present purposes we just need to point out that to derive a Bell
inequality it is sufficient to require that the joint probabilities of experimental outcomes given
by a model is factorisable, i.e., that it can be written in the form
P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|a, κ, λ)P (B|b, κ, λ). (13)
This equation is one way of expressing the condition on which Bell bestowed the name local
causality [5].
To see that locality and determinism imply factorisability, note that the joint probabil-
ities of any model can be written as P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|B, a, b, κ, λ)P (B|a, b, κ, λ). If
the model is deterministic, then P (A|B, a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|a, b, κ, λ), because A is already de-
termined by a, b, κ, λ. From the definition of locality given by Eq. (7) we thus arrive at the
factorisable model of Eq. (13).
We now arrive at our main result, that the conjunction of signal locality and predictability
also allow one to derive Bell inequalities. The proof is simple. The definition of predictability
(Eq. (11)), implies that
P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A,B|a, b, κ) = P (A|B, a, b, κ)P (B|a, b, κ). (14)
The first equality follows because the second expression must be either 0 or 1, thus those
probabilities cannot be altered by conditioning on λ. The second equality follows from the
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definition of conditional probabilities. Eq. (11) also implies that P (A|B, a, b, κ) = P (A|a, b, κ),
since A is already specified by a, b, κ. Thus P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|a, b, κ)P (B|a, b, κ). As-
suming signal locality, i.e. Eq. (8), we obtain
P (A,B|a, b, κ, λ) = P (A|a, κ)P (B|b, κ). (15)
This has the factorisable form of (13), as we set out to prove. To make that more explicit, note
that this is equivalent to a model with P (A|a, κ, λ) = P (A|a, κ) and P (B|b, κ, λ) = P (B|b, κ)
for all λ. Therefore, signal locality plus predictability imply factorisability, and thus Bell
inequalities.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Bell was adamant in stressing that his concept of locality was distinct from the concept of
signal locality. In fact, he rejected the importance of the concept of signal locality, as he
understood that it was hard to talk about it without using apparently anthropocentric terms
like ‘information’ and ‘controllability’:
"Suppose we are finally obliged to accept the existence of these correlations at long
range [...]. Can we then signal faster than light? To answer this we need at least
a schematic theory of what we can do, a fragment of a theory of human beings.
Suppose we can control variables like a and b above, but not those like A and B.
I do not quite know what ‘like’ means here, but suppose the beables somehow fall
into two classes, ‘controllables’ and ‘uncontrollables’. The latter are no use for
sending signals, but can be used for reception." [5].
And he rejects the idea that signal locality could be taken as the fundamental limitation
imposed by relativity:
"Do we have to fall back on ‘no signalling faster than light’ as the expression of
the fundamental causal structure of contemporary theoretical physics? That is
hard for me to accept. For one thing we have lost the idea that correlations can
be explained, or at least this idea awaits reformulation. More importantly, the
‘no signalling...’ notion rests on concepts which are desperately vague, or vaguely
applicable. The assertion that ‘we cannot signal faster than light’ immediately
provokes the question:
Who do we think we are?
We who can make ‘measurements’, we who can manipulate ‘external fields’, we
who can signal at all, even if not faster than light? Do we include chemists, or
only physicists, plants, or only animals, pocket calculators, or only mainframe
computers?" [6].
Bell is right in that we cannot define signal locality without referring to operational or epi-
stemic concepts, but we find this situation more acceptable than Bell did. The reason is that
‘information’ and thus ‘signal’ are themselves operational concepts. We do indeed need to
know which variables are controllable, and which variables are knowable, in order to define
4 Discussion and conclusion 8
signal locality. However, while “controllable” and “knowable” may be as philosophically prob-
lematic as “information”, they are also just as pragmatically clear and useful. Besides, the use
of these terms does not need to imply an anthropocentric view of physics as he seemed to be
worried in the passage above. There seems to be no fundamental difficulty in talking about,
say, machines “knowing” or “controlling” the variables defined in the previous section.
Since experiments routinely violate Bell inequalities (up to some open loopholes), we can
conclude, through the theorem proven in the previous section, that signal locality and pre-
dictability cannot both the true. Now this allows an interesting conclusion. Bell showed in
1964 that locality and determinism cannot both be true. Some people have taken that to
imply indeterminism, choosing to keep locality. However, a deterministic model (Bohmian
mechanics) exists that reproduces quantum theory, while violating locality. One may reject
this or similar models on other grounds (e.g. elegance, symmetry, etc.), but Bell’s theorem
cannot be used to that end. Furthermore, Bell later showed that the stronger concept of local
causality also implies Bell inequalities and must therefore be false. So even if one chooses to
reject determinism, the resulting indeterminism still has a nonlocal character, by Bell’s later
argument. The result is thus that nothing can be concluded separately about the ontological
claims of determinism and locality from the violation of Bell inequalities.
However, the validity of signal locality has a much less controversial footing. Even those
who believe in the violation of locality would generally agree that the operational assumption
of signal locality must be valid, and that while a violation of locality may have a “peaceful
coexistence” [19] with relativity, a violation of signal locality would be in direct contradiction
with it. Therefore the full weight of the violation of Bell inequalities can be confidently
transferred to the violation of the operational concept of predictability: there can be no
predictable model that allows violation of a Bell inequality. To the extent that those violations
actually occur in nature, we can conclude that the world is indeed fundamentally unpredictable.
Furthermore, we arrive at this conclusion without needing to assume anything about
quantum mechanics. It is simply a consequence of bare experimental data and an uncon-
troversial consequence of the theory of relativity. Bohr, of course, could not have known about
this result before Bell, but if he did, he could have much more easily convinced Einstein that
his attempts to make quantum phenomena predictable were bound to fail9. And in another
twist of irony, he could have again used Einstein’s own theory of relativity to prove him wrong.
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